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Birth rates are falling across much of the world, from Europe and East Asia to North America and Latin America. People are delaying parenthood, having fewer children, or deciding not to have them at all.
Researchers tie the shift to rising housing and childcare costs, insecure work, later partnership and marriage, changing social norms, and concern about the future. The result is a world with slower population growth, older societies, and tougher choices for governments and families.
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A long decline in birth rates is reshaping the world.
The trend is no longer limited to a small group of rich countries. It now stretches across much of Europe, East Asia, North America, and parts of Latin America, while fertility has also been falling in many middle-income and lower-income countries. In 2024, the global fertility rate stood at about 2.25 births per woman, far below the level seen a generation ago. In more than half of countries and territories, fertility is already below the level needed to keep population size stable without migration.
The fall in childbearing has been building for decades, but the scale is now hard to ignore. Across OECD countries, fertility averages about 1.46 children per woman in 2024. In the European Union, the rate fell to 1.34 in 2024, the lowest level recorded for the bloc since comparable data began. The EU also saw about 3.55 million births in 2024, down 3.3% from a year earlier.
Some countries remain outliers, but the broad direction is the same. In South Korea, fertility has been among the world’s lowest. Japan, Italy and Spain also remain in very low-fertility territory. In the United States, the picture is flatter rather than sharply falling, but births are still well below earlier decades. Provisional data show 3,622,673 births in 2024, up 1% from 2023, while teenage birth rates fell again to another record low.
This is not simply a story of people abandoning family life. In many places, people still say they want children, but not always under current conditions.
## Why people are having fewer children
The reasons differ by country, but several themes keep appearing.
The first is timing. People are studying longer, entering stable work later, and forming long-term partnerships later than earlier generations. In low-fertility countries, childbearing has shifted to older ages. By 2024, about two thirds of these countries had a mean age of childbearing above 30.
The second is cost. Housing has become harder to afford in many cities. Childcare and education can be expensive. Secure jobs are not always easy to find, especially for younger adults. OECD analysis points to labour-market insecurity, housing pressure and childcare costs as major constraints on family plans.
The third is social change. Parenthood is still important for many people, but it is no longer treated everywhere as the default path into adulthood. Women’s education and employment have expanded. Marriage patterns have changed. In some countries, more births now happen outside marriage, while in others delayed marriage still leads to delayed or fewer births.
The fourth is uncertainty. A 2025 survey across 14 countries found many adults felt they would not be able to have the number of children they wanted. Financial limits were a major reason. Many also pointed to fears about climate change, conflict, pandemics, and the general state of the future.

## What comes next
The next phase is already visible: slower population growth, more rapid ageing, and greater pressure on pension, health and care systems.
The global population is still growing, but more slowly than before. The United Nations says the total number of births worldwide has fluctuated for decades and is expected to begin a sustained decline soon. At the same time, people are living longer. That means a larger share of older people and a smaller share of workers in many economies.
In Europe, natural population change has been negative for years, with deaths exceeding births, and migration has been offsetting part of that loss. The same pattern is expected to matter more in other regions as low fertility persists. In countries such as the United States, Canada and Australia, immigration is likely to remain an important reason populations continue to grow despite below-replacement fertility.
For employers and governments, the practical effects are wide. Labour shortages may grow in sectors such as health care, elder care, construction and transport. Public finances may come under strain as fewer workers support more retirees. Some rural areas may keep losing population even if major cities continue to expand.
## Can policy reverse the trend?
Governments have tried cash payments, tax breaks, baby bonuses, housing support, paid leave and childcare expansion. These measures can help families and may raise births modestly in some cases, especially when policies reduce the everyday cost and stress of raising children. But there is little evidence that any single policy can quickly restore fertility to older levels.
The clearer lesson is narrower and more practical. People are more likely to have the children they want when housing is affordable, jobs are secure, childcare is available, health care is accessible, and care work is shared more evenly between women and men.
That means the future debate may shift away from asking how to push birth rates up, and toward how to build societies that can support both family life and an ageing population at the same time. The answer will probably include a mix of family policy, workplace reform, migration, and better long-term planning for older societies.
AI Perspective
Lower birth rates are not one simple crisis with one simple cause. They reflect both progress, such as better education and reproductive choice, and pressure, such as high costs and insecurity. What matters next is whether societies make it easier for people to build the lives and families they actually want.